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ABSTRACT
This article aims to explain longitudinal and cross-sectional variation in regional 
government composition – oversized majorities and incongruence between 
regional and national governments (cross-cutting) – and regional government 
alternation. The analysis focuses on the explanatory value of a wide range of 
regional-level institutional variables, such as majoritarian vs. proportional voting 
systems and established practices of consociationalism. In addition, it provides 
a tentative exploration of the impact of regional (i.e. non-state-wide) parties 
on government composition and alternation. The findings show that most 
institutional variables have the expected impact, e.g., majoritarian voting systems 
increase government alternation and consensual practices decrease both cross-
cutting and alternation. The analysis also suggests that regional parties impact 
on government composition and alternation in two ways. Strong regional parties 
increase cross-cutting and, once in office, they tend to reduce alternation. Smaller 
regional parties out of office tend to increase alternation and to decrease oversized 
government as their seat shares grow.
KEYWORDS regional government; regional executive; regional parties; regional elections
In spite of a decades-long process of federalisation, devolution, and regionalisa-
tion of European states (Hooghe et al. 2016a), and discounting extremely rare 
early works (Downs 1998), the comparative literature on regional government 
and regional democracy is still in its infancy. Most studies, albeit extremely val-
uable, are based on research conducted in only one or two countries (Däubler 
and Debus 2009; Debus 2008; Deschouwer 2013; Falcó-Gimeno 2012; Falcó-
Gimenom and Verge 2013; Klingelhofer 2016; Klingelhofer and Müller 2015; 
Orte and Wilson 2009; Ştefuriuc 2009; Tronconi 2014). So far, Bäck et al.’s 
(2013) work on seven Western European countries, covering about two decades 
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(1990s‒2000s), represents the most extensive work on regional government 
formation. In addition, most of these studies have primarily drawn on theories 
of government formation developed at national level – office seeking and pol-
icy seeking – adding a special focus on government congruence between the 
regional and national level (Bäck et al. 2013; Däubler and Debus 2009; Debus 
2008; Deschouwer 2009; Falcó-Gimenom and Verge 2013; Ştefuriuc 2009).
While this article departs from this body of literature in its analytical focus, 
it complements and supports the scholarship on regional government and 
regional democracy in two ways. First, we present a much-needed comparative 
analysis of regional institutional architectures, specific dynamics of regional 
politics, and constellations of regional government. In spite of relative homo-
geneity in democratic standards within Western Europe, the evidence shows 
great variance in basic institutional features of regional executives – such as 
elected or appointed heads of executives, monocratic or collegial executives, 
and presidential or parliamentary systems – both across countries and, in some 
cases, within them. Therefore, the dataset underlying the comparative analysis 
of regional institutions presented in this article represents, per se, an original 
contribution that will also be of use for those who want to replicate, comparing 
a wider set of countries, studies on multi-level government formation.1
Secondly, rather than investigating which parties enter government coali-
tions at regional level and focusing on the effect of national government, we 
aim to explain not only multi-level government congruence but also other 
key features of regional government, namely government alternation and the 
presence of oversized majority coalitions. In doing so, we explore the impact 
of three clusters of regional-level factors. First, the ‘institutional set-up of the 
regional executive’, which includes the formal powers of regional government 
(self-rule and shared rule), properties of the executive head (chosen by the 
regional assembly, appointed by central government or presidential office), and 
the informal practice of forming consensus governments. Second, we inves-
tigate the impact of ‘electoral rules’, which includes the application of differ-
ent voting systems (majoritarian or proportional rule) and the timing of the 
regional election vis-à-vis local, other regional, and national elections. The third 
set of variables taps into ‘political regionalism’ and includes a dummy to indicate 
regions with a particularly strong regional identity (labelled ‘Rokkan region’), 
as well as the seat share and government participation of regional parties.
Several of our findings have important implications for the study of regional 
government. First, we find that general ‘characteristics of regional executives’ 
have a large impact on multi-level government congruence, alternation, and the 
presence of oversized coalitions. These results indicate that an appreciation of 
the variation in regional institutional architectures is crucial for a comprehen-
sive understanding of regional democracy. Second, we find that regional exec-
utives formed after regional elections which are held simultaneously with other 
regional elections experience more alternation and have a lower probability 
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WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  3
to be oversized, but we find the opposite effects when regional elections are 
held simultaneously with local elections. These results strongly indicate that 
regional executive formation should be studied in its multi-level electoral con-
text. Finally, we find that alternation increases with the size of the regional party 
seat share when a regional party is not in government but alternation decreases 
when a regional party is in government. Our explanation for this result is that 
electorally weaker regional parties may act as brokers between centre-left and 
centre-right state-wide parties which are competing for office and which rely 
on support from regional parties. But when regional parties increase their vote 
and seat shares they become viable options for regional office and once voted 
into executive government they can use the regional governmental machinery 
to their advantage and galvanise regional voters and induce them to vote the 
party into office time and again.
In the next section, we review the relevant literature on government for-
mation in multi-level polities. In the third section, we present a descriptive 
overview of regional institutional architectures and of the composition and 
alternation of regional government for 2055 regional governments clustered in 
260 regions nested in 13 countries. The fourth section presents a multivariate 
analysis to explain the variation in composition and alternation of regional 
executive government, and the final section summarises the main results and 
discusses our conclusions.
State of the art and theoretical framework
The great merit of the regional government literature has been to highlight the 
interaction between the national and regional level (Bäck et al. 2013; Däubler 
and Debus 2009; Debus 2008; Falcó-Gimeno 2012; Klingelhofer and Müller 
2015; Klingelhofer 2016; Orte and Wilson 2009; Ştefuriuc 2009). In particu-
lar, most works have looked at congruence/incongruence between the (often 
coalition) governments formed across levels. While different scholars have 
taken different perspectives – e.g. the strategic perspective of state-wide par-
ties (Falcó-Gimenom and Verge 2013) vs. the strategic perspective of regional 
parties (Tronconi 2014) ‒ or have stressed some peculiar factors such as the 
absence of state-wide parties and a national electoral arena in the case of 
Belgium (Deschouwer 2009), all these studies have confirmed a tendency to 
avoid cross-cutting coalitions across the national and regional levels (i.e. to 
pursue cross-level congruence).
While drawing on this authoritative body of literature, this article departs 
from it and complements it in several respects. First, we aim to go beyond 
studying which parties form governments at regional level, rather devoting 
our attention to some key characteristics of regional government composition 
(oversized majorities and cross-cutting) and alternation, which are recognised 
as substantive features of the working of democracy (Ieraci 2012). Secondly, 
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4   A. H. SCHAKEL AND E. MASSETTI
compared to the widest studies on regional government (Bäck et al. 2013), 
we almost double the cross-sectional scope, raising the number of included 
countries from 7 to 13, and considerably extend the longitudinal scope: we 
have collected regional government data for 2055 regional governments for 260 
regions in 13 countries from 1945 until 2015 (Table 1).2 It is important to note 
that it is the inclusion of more countries that has triggered the need to build 
up a dataset on regional political institutions, as the ideal type of parliamen-
tary democracy does not apply (or does not apply any longer) to the regional 
institutional setting in several countries.
Thirdly, we want to identify the main factors that may impact on the key 
characteristics of regional government composition. We are the first to look at 
regional executive government in such a large spatial and temporal scope and 
we do not have much theory or literature to rely on. We draw on ‘new institu-
tionalism’ (March and Olsen 1984) – as it emerged in its three main strands 
within political science (Hall and Taylor 1996): ‘rational choice institutional-
ism’, ‘historical institutionalism’, and ‘sociological institutionalism’ – to identify 
independent variables impacting on regional government. All three approaches 
prescribe bringing institutions to centre stage but they differ substantively on 
both the connotation and denotation of the concept of ‘institutions’ and on the 
explanatory use of these concepts. Rational choice and historical institution-
alism lead us to include formal and informal (i.e. consensus democracy) insti-
tutions relating to the ‘regional executive’ itself and to the ‘electoral rules’. The 
‘sociological institutionalist’ approach induces us to include variables related to 
Table 1. included countries, regions, and governments.
Country
Regions Governments
Tier N First Last N
austria länder 9 1945 2015 140
Belgium Gewesten/Gemeenschappen 4 1990 2014 22
Denmark amter 15 1970 2001 135
regions 5 2001 2013 15
France régions 22 1986 2010 110
régions 13 2015 2015 13
Germany länder (West) 10 1946 2015 185
länder (east) 6 1990 2014 36
Greece nomoi 47 1994 2006 188
periphereia 13 2010 2010 26
italy regioni a statuto ordinarie 15 1970 2015 151
regioni a statuto speciale 7 1947 2013 73
netherlands provincies 12 1945 2015 206
norway Fylker 19 1975 2015 209
spain comunidades autonómas (non- 
historic)
13 1983 2015 119
comunidades autonómas (historic) 4 1980 2015 39
ciudades autónomas 2 1995 2015 12
sweden län 21 1994 2014 125
switzerland cantons 26 1980 2015 231
united Kingdom Devolved entities 4 1998 2016 20
    260     2055
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WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  5
‘political regionalism’, i.e. political parties that tend to politicise socio-cultural 
and socio-economic instances of specific regions.
Regional executives
Rational choice institutionalism tends to have a relatively restricted under-
standing of ‘institutions’ and focuses on the set of incentives and constraints 
they place on political actors. Previous studies on regional government have 
made some use of rational choice institutionalism, albeit limited to the level of 
regional authority. Following Bäck et al. (2013), as a result of more power being 
at stake, we expect self-rule to lead to more autonomous government forma-
tion processes at regional level and, therefore, to more cross-cutting vis-à-vis 
the national government. As for shared rule, in general terms we also accept 
Bäck et al.’s (2013) argument that more regional representation in a powerful 
(often federal) upper chamber should be expected to place strong incentives 
on cross-level congruence (i.e. less cross-cutting), as the parties in office at 
the national level do not want to find themselves in a minority position in the 
second chamber of parliament. However, just to exemplify the importance of 
comparative regional constitutionalism, this logic will especially hold for the 
cases where members of the national high chamber are chosen by the regional 
executive (e.g. in Germany) and less so for cases where these members are 
elected by the regional assembly (e.g. in Austria or in the Netherlands) or 
directly by the regional electorate (e.g. in Switzerland). We therefore treat this 
expectation with scepticism.
Secondly, we want to investigate the potential effect of appointed (from 
above) heads of regional governments, speculating that this should have a pos-
itive effect on oversized majority governments. Thirdly, we want to account for 
the impact of presidential (monocratic) executive bodies, as opposed to col-
legial executives in which the head is a primus inter pares in regional cabinet. 
This institutional feature might work in favour of government alternation, as 
it makes the nature of regional executives more majoritarian, or against it, as 
regional politics might become dominated by strong personalities who manage 
to win the regional presidency for several terms.
We draw upon the ‘historical institutionalist’ approach to bring in un-cod-
ified practices and political habits that, though subject to change in the long 
term, introduce an element of inertia and even path-dependency in how the 
process of government formation is dealt with. In particular, we aim to account 
for practices of consensual democracy, which might have been established 
at national and/or regional level in some countries (Dandoy and Schakel 
2013; Deschouwer 2006; Lehmbruch 1993, 2003; Lijphart 1969; Lijphart and 
Crepaz 1991; van Haute and Deschouwer 2017). This variable has proven to be 
explanatory when particular countries are taken as case studies – such as the 
Netherlands (Klingelhofer and Müller 2015) – or, as is the case for this article, 
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when they are included in a comparative study. We expect that consensual 
democracy has a strong positive impact on oversized majority governments, a 
negative impact on government alternation, and a negative impact on cross-cut-
ting (as oversized regional governments increase the chances of multi-level 
congruence).
Electoral rules
Within the rational-choice institutionalist approach, we bring in several other 
variables whose potential effects have not yet been tested at the regional level. 
First, we distinguish between predominantly majoritarian electoral systems, 
which we expect to discourage oversized majority governments and to favour 
alternation in government; and proportional electoral systems, which might 
open the way for oversized majority governments and less government alter-
nation. We also include variables on the electoral cycle that relate to the ‘sec-
ond-order election’ model: timing of the regional election vis-à-vis national 
elections, regional (horizontal) simultaneity, and (vertical) simultaneity with 
local elections (Dandoy and Schakel 2013; Pallarés and Keating 2003; Schakel 
and Jeffery 2013). The idea for including the electoral timing variables is that 
second-order election effects, which include protest voting by punishing par-
ties in national government by voting for national opposition (or new) par-
ties, increases around mid-term. Hence, cross-cutting and alternation may 
increase to the extent that electoral timing induces second-order election 
effects. Regional simultaneity is expected to reinforce second-order election 
effects because the vote can be seen as a national test; while local simultaneity 
is expected to regionalise/localise the electoral campaign, thus not favouring 
second-order effects (Dandoy and Schakel 2013; Schakel 2017).
Political regionalism
Within political regionalism we put at the centre the role of regional parties, 
amongst which the biggest and most influential ones are also ‘regionalist’ parties 
(De Winter and Tursan 1998; Massetti 2009). These are the political actors that 
tend to benefit most from the establishment of regional elections and regional 
governments (Brancati 2008; Massetti and Schakel 2017). This choice draws on 
previous works, which have suggested that: (a) the presence of regional parties 
create a bi-dimensional regional space (traditional left‒right plus a centre‒
periphery dimension) that changes the dynamics of competition and govern-
ment formation (Ştefuriuc 2009); (b) the number of regional parties entering 
regional office has increased substantively in the last two decades (Elias and 
Tronconi 2011); (c) strong regional parties that get into office at regional level 
tend to hold on to it for long periods due to their strongly identitarian appeal 
(Alonso et al. 2015: 17); (d) they tend to be less judged (and penalised) by voters 
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on executive performance (Alonso 2008: 101); and (e) regional parties are far 
from immune from the general pressure for vertical congruence in government 
formation (Tronconi 2014).
Surely regional parties can be expected to have an effect on regional govern-
ment composition, and particularly on multi-level congruence, given the fact 
that they usually increase party system incongruence across levels (Dandoy 
and Schakel 2013; Schakel 2017). However, an important contribution of this 
article concerns proposing two additional, different, and quite opposing effects 
on the composition and alternation of regional executive government. In a first 
scenario, electorally strong regional parties are viable contenders for regional 
office and once voted into office they tend to hold on to it, thereby decreasing 
alternation and increasing cross-cutting (incongruence) between the regional 
and national government. The Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) in South Tyrol 
and the Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) in Bavaria represent the most strik-
ing examples, as they governed their respective region continuously (except 
for the short period 1954–1957 for the CSU) for about seven decades. Yet 
several other examples also fall into this first mechanism, such as the Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), which led regional office in the Spanish Basque 
Country from 1980 to 2005 and then again from 2012 to the present (2017); 
the Union Valdotaine (UV), which has led the regional government in the 
Italian region of Val d’Aosta for more than two decades; Convergencia i Unio 
federation (CiU), which led the regional government in Catalonia from 1980 to 
1999; as well as others that appear to be set in that trajectory, such as the Scottish 
National Party (SNP), which has led Scotland’s regional executive since 2007.
A second scenario emphasises the effects of electorally less strong regional 
parties which can act as pivot actors between centre-left and centre-right state-
wide parties which compete for office. These parties will increase alternation 
and, to the extent they become electorally stronger, they will also decrease the 
occurrence of oversized government. One example of this second mechanism 
can be provided by the electoral growth of the Partido Regionalista de Cantabria 
(PRC), which helped to change the balance of power in the Spanish region of 
Cantabria. After supporting a centre-right regional government for two terms 
in the period 1995–2003, the PRC was crucial in determining that a centre-left 
regional government prevailed in the period 2003–2011 and then again in 
2015, after another centre-right-led term in 2011–2015. Similarly, the modest 
electoral weight of the Partito Sardo d’Azione (PSdAz), which had previously 
gravitated around the dominant centre-right party, was still important in the 
shift to a centre-left regional government in 1985. The same party had a similar 
effect, but in the opposite direction, almost three decades later, brokering an 
alternation in regional office from the centre-left to the centre-right in 2009.
In summary, we aim to make three contributions to the literature on regional 
government. First, while previous works have largely overlooked regional 
institutional features – with the exception of regional authority in respect to 
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cross-cutting government (Bäck et al. 2013) and the presence of traditions of 
consociational democracy (Klingelhofer and Müller 2015) – we try to bring it 
in as much as possible, looking at the nature of regional executives (selected 
from below or appointed from above, monocratic or collegial) and their rela-
tionship with the regional legislative body (presidential vs. parliamentary sys-
tems), besides including the levels of regional authority. Second, drawing on 
the literature on multi-level elections (Dandoy and Schakel 2013; Pallarés and 
Keating 2003; Schakel and Jeffery 2013), as well as on single-country studies on 
regional multi-level government formation (Deschouwer 2009), we consider 
the possible effects of electoral systems and multi-level electoral cycles. Third, 
regarding regional parties we seek to tentatively test two mechanisms with 
opposing effects on alternation and the occurrence of oversized government. 
In the next section, we present a descriptive overview of regional institutional 
architectures and we compare the constellation and alternation of executive 
government between the regional and national levels.
Descriptive analysis of regional institutional architectures and 
regional executive government
We start our analysis with a descriptive overview of the basic features of regional 
institutional architectures. Then we proceed with a comparison between 
regional and national governments regarding their composition and extent of 
alternation. In the subsequent section, we will present the results of multivar-
iate analyses on the determinants for alternating, cross-cutting, and oversized 
regional government.
Regional institutional architectures
An overview of the basic features of regional institutional architectures in 13 
Western European countries (Table 2) reveals a dominant pattern of full par-
liamentary democracy – Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy (before 1999), Spain, 
Switzerland, and three UK regions (Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales). Yet 
the overview also reveals important variance, particularly but not exclusively 
across countries.3 First, while most regional executives are legitimated exclu-
sively by popular vote, either via the election of regional assemblies or directly, 
in some regions the head of the executive is fully appointed from above – the 
Netherlands – or is flanked in important executive functions by a prefect/gov-
ernor appointed from above – France, Norway, Sweden, and Northern Ireland 
and Wales in the United Kingdom. Secondly, while most regional executive 
bodies are collegial (i.e. a regional cabinet headed by a first minister/president), 
some regions have monocratic executives – Denmark, France (except Corsica), 
Greece, and Greater London in the United Kingdom. Thirdly, some regions 
– post-1999 Italian regions (with the exception of South Tyrol) and Greater 
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10   A. H. SCHAKEL AND E. MASSETTI
London – have direct elections for the head of the executive. Fourthly, some 
regions apply codified or (more often) uncodified consociational rules when 
they form the regional executive (in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and South Tyrol in Italy), with important consequences 
for the likelihood of oversized government.
Regional executive government
We address regional executive government according to two characteristics 
which we think are important for describing how democracy functions at the 
regional level. First, we look at the composition of regional executive govern-
ment by measuring the combined vote and seat share of parties, whether the 
government is oversized or not, and the extent to which a regional government 
cross-cuts the constellation of national executive government. We classify a 
regional government as oversized when the combined seat share of the parties 
involved in executive government remains above 50% if the smallest coalition 
partner is excluded. Cross-cutting is operationalised by computing the share 
of parliamentarians that need to switch their party affiliation to make full con-
gruence between regional and national government (Bäck et al. 2013). Another 
element of regional executive government formation is the extent to which it 
alternates. We look at the change in seat share because of incoming and out-
going parties but also due to the outcome of the election for the parties that 
remain in government, and whether the major (largest or senior) party changes.
In Table 3 we display average regional scores (R) on the six characteristics 
and we compare them to the average for national executive governments (N). 
National executive government is similarly operationalised as regional govern-
ment and we only include the latest national election held before the included 
regional elections. In Denmark, France, Greece, Italy (ordinary statute regions 
until the early 2000s), the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, regional elec-
tion cycles are fixed and early elections are not possible (Table 2). In Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy (special statute regions), and Spain, early elections are 
possible but relatively rare, especially compared to the national level.
What emerges from Table 3 is that regional government tends to be more 
inclusive than national government. If we look at the vote and seat share support 
base for the government and the extent to which we find oversized govern-
ments, we observe that they are generally higher at the regional level than at the 
national level. The difference is especially stark for Austria, the Netherlands, and 
Norway, which highlights a strong effect of the informal rule to form regional 
government on a consociational basis. Not surprisingly, when regional execu-
tive power is vested in one monocratic office, as is the case in Denmark, France, 
and Greece, oversized government does not occur and the vote and seat share 
support bases are lower than can be found at the national level.
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WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  11
Another important observation from Table 3 is that alternation in office is 
much more uncommon at the regional than at the national level. This is the 
case for regions which apply consociational rules (in Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) as well as for most regions which do not (in 
Denmark, France, Greece, Spain, and the UK). In addition, this feature does not 
seem to depend on whether regional elections are held under proportional rule 
or have majoritarian elements (France since 2004, Greece, and three cantons 
in Switzerland) or higher frequency of minority governments at the national 
level (Denmark, Norway, and Spain).
The previous two observations lead to a third observation which is probably 
most accurately described as a caveat associated with the variable cross-cutting 
(or congruence) between regional and national governments, which features 
prominently in the (sparse) literature on regional executives. The extent of 
cross-cutting needs to be interpreted with great care because similar degrees 
of congruence between regional and national governments can be the result 
of minority government at the national level or represent a different outcome 
Table 3. Description of executive government at the regional and national levels in 13 
countries.
notes: entries for ‘regional’ are average values for executive governments formed after regional elections 
(see table 1). entries for ‘national’ are averages for national elections which have been held during the 
same time period as when regional elections have been held (see table 1).
Country Tier Votes (%) Seats (%) Oversized
Cross- 
cutting
Alterna-
tion major 
party
Alterna-
tion seats 
(%)
austria r 86.75 89.97 0.81 0.31 0.07 0.09
n 66.85 69.58 0.05 n.a. 0.15 0.18
Belgium r 56.75 60.91 0.43 0.66 0.42 0.35
n 54.99 61.69 0.43 n.a. 0.50 0.30
Denmark r 32.83 34.45 0.00 0.69 0.18 0.25
n 36.98 37.85 0.08 n.a. 0.45 0.55
France r 40.25 50.19 0.00 0.86 0.25 0.33
n 47.84 55.88 0.00 n.a. 0.40 0.46
Germany r 55.44 59.41 0.44 0.63 0.20 0.28
n 56.54 58.57 0.33 n.a. 0.24 0.15
Greece r 53.46 61.32 0.00 0.52 0.46 0.47
n 43.92 54.83 0.00 n.a. 0.60 0.57
italy r 51.90 57.61 0.57 0.51 0.44 0.47
n 48.65 53.87 0.71 n.a. 0.31 0.38
netherlands r 72.29 75.03 0.74 0.37 0.21 0.15
n 61.29 63.06 0.50 n.a. 0.29 0.36
norway r 86.46 88.30 0.90 0.53 0.21 0.15
n 40.35 43.29 0.00 n.a. 0.60 0.58
spain r 45.74 49.90 0.45 0.63 0.32 0.35
n 38.19 46.17 0.00 n.a. 0.44 0.47
sweden r 52.40 53.75 0.31 0.58 0.26 0.33
n 44.35 45.70 0.00 n.a. 0.40 0.44
switzerland r 79.19 82.86 0.93 0.33 0.09 0.10
n 75.42 82.80 1.00 n.a. 0.00 0.06
united r 47.61 56.83 0.25 0.69 0.25 0.29
Kingdom n 43.02 57.53 0.00 n.a. 0.25 0.30
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12   A. H. SCHAKEL AND E. MASSETTI
of government formation at the regional level (Denmark and Norway vis-à-vis 
Germany and Spain). Similarly, high congruence between regional and national 
government in Austria and the Netherlands is most likely a result of consoci-
ational practices which lead to oversized governments that overlap across the 
levels, rather than just reflecting the will of national political actors trying to 
establish congruent government.
Multivariate analysis on the determinants of the constellation and 
alternation of regional executive government
We are interested in the determinants of the constellation and alternation of 
regional executives. For constellation we observe the extent to which regional 
government cross-cuts national government (which varies between fully 
congruent (= 0) to fully incongruent (= 1))4 and whether the government is 
oversized (= 1) or not (= 0).5 For alternation, we look at the proportion of 
seat share change in between consecutive governments (varying from 0, no 
change in governmental parties and their seat shares, to 1, all parties are new 
in government)6 and whether the major party alternates between consecutive 
governments (0 = no; 1 = yes).7 Our unit of analysis is a regional government 
formed after a regional election or, if multiple governments have been formed 
in between regional elections, the regional government which lasted longest 
in between two consecutive regional elections.8
Our nine independent variables are operationalised as follows. Self-rule and 
shared rule regional scores are taken from Hooghe et al. (2016a). Centrally 
appointed executive heads,9 presidential executives,10 consensual systems,11 
and electoral systems with majoritarian elements12 are indicated by dummy 
variables which score positive when the characteristic is present in a region 
(Table 2). The impact of the placement of the regional election in the national 
election cycle is assessed with a year and year squared variable whereby time 
reflects the number of years (number of months divided by 12) between a 
regional and a previously held national election. The impacts of regional13 and 
local14 simultaneity are assessed by dummy variables whereby a positive score 
indicates simultaneity (Table 2).
‘Political regionalism’ is measured by three variables: whether a region has 
a particularly distinct identity (‘Rokkan region’); share of seats for regional 
parties (Massetti and Schakel 2017); and regional party in office (Massetti and 
Schakel 2015). The first variable (‘Rokkan region’) is itself a synthesis of three 
indicators – geographical isolation, presence of regional languages, history of 
autonomy or independence (Hooghe et al. 2016b) – which are widely seen as 
sources of regional distinctiveness and regionalism (Fitjar 2010). This variable 
is expected to have a positive effect on cross-cutting. A regional party wins 
seats in one region only (Brancati 2008) and we include parties that win seats 
in more than one region (but not state-wide) when we know that the party is 
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WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  13
regionalist, i.e. prioritises its position on the centre‒periphery dimension over 
its position on the left‒right dimensions (Massetti and Schakel 2015, 2016).15 
We interact the share of seats for regional parties with a dummy variable indi-
cating whether a regional party is in office.
Our dependent variables cross-cutting and alternation in proportion of seats 
vary between 0 and 1 whereas oversized and alternation of the major party can 
take the value of either 0 or 1. This difference has important implications for 
our modelling strategy. We employ multi-level linear regression models for 
cross-cutting and alternation in proportion of seats whereby regional govern-
ments are clustered in regions which are nested in countries. For oversized gov-
ernments and alternation of the major party we run a logit model suitable for 
panel data whereby governments are clustered in regions. The models include 
an autocorrelation coefficient (rho) to control for possible time dependencies.16
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are pro-
vided in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix. The full model results are pre-
sented in Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix and in Figures 1 and 2 we display 
marginal effects for each of the independent variables on the four dependent 
variables. The marginal effects represent the impact of the presence of a factor 
(dummy variables) or the impact of one standard deviation increase (self-rule, 
0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
Figure 1. Marginal effects of the institutional set-up of regional executives, electoral rules, 
and political regionalism on cross-cutting and alternation of regional executive government.
notes: the marginal effects represent the impact of the presence of a factor (dummy variables) or the impact 
of one standard deviation increase (self-rule, shared rule, and vote share for regional parties). the results are 
based on the models presented in table a3.
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14   A. H. SCHAKEL AND E. MASSETTI
shared rule, and vote share for regional parties). The results of the multi-level 
linear regression models (cross-cutting and alternation in proportion of seats) 
are shown in Figure 1 and the odds ratios derived from the logit models are 
displayed in Figure 2. To ease the interpretation of odds ratios we also report 
on predicted probabilities, which are estimated by changing the independent 
variable of interest while keeping the dummy variables at their mode and non-
dummy variables at their mean.
Results of the multivariate analysis
All independent variables, except for the Rokkan region dummy, attain statis-
tical significance for one or more dependent variables. One standard deviation 
increase in self-rule increases cross-cutting by 0.06 points and alternation in 
proportion of seats by 0.03 points. The positive effect of self-rule on alter-
nation in proportion of seats is mitigated once a region obtains shared rule 
which reduces alternation in proportion of seats with 0.04 points per stand-
ard deviation increase. The results for self-rule confirm Bäck et al.’s (2013) 
findings but we find no decreasing impact of shared rule on cross-cutting. 
Figure 2. Marginal effects of the institutional set-up of regional executives, electoral rules, 
and political regionalism on alternation of the major party and oversized regional executive 
government.
notes: the marginal effects represent the change in odds ratios in the presence of a factor (dummy variables) 
or in response to one standard deviation increase (self-rule, shared rule, and vote share for regional parties). 
the results are based on the models presented in table a4.
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WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  15
Cross-cutting multi-level government is higher for regions where the exec-
utive head is appointed by the central government (0.18 points) as well as in 
regions where there is a presidential system (0.13 points); whereas it is lower 
for regions which have a practice of forming consensus coalition government 
(‒0.15 points).
The predicted probability of finding oversized government is 61% (while 
keeping dummy variables at their mode and non-dummy variables at their 
mean)17 and, not surprisingly, this probability goes up to 91% for consensus 
regions and goes down to 24% in regions whose executive head is centrally 
appointed. The probability that the major party is ousted from office is 44% 
and it decreases to 33% with centrally appointed heads, to 26% for presidential 
executives, and to 12% in regions with a tradition of consensual politics. Taken 
together, the results clearly indicate that the institutional architecture heavily 
impacts on regional executive constellation and alternation.
Regional electoral rules also impact heavily on regional government except 
for cross-cutting. Simultaneous regional elections increase cross-cutting by 
0.13 points. This finding is in line with our expectation that parties in national 
office tend to be punished in regional elections when the latter take the charac-
ter of a national test (as in simultaneous regional elections). Majoritarian rule 
significantly increases alternation of seats by 0.19 points and the probability 
of an alternating major party increases from 44% to 74%. Confirming our 
expectations, simultaneous regional elections increase alternation (0.15 points 
or 15% for seat share and 25% for the major party), whereas simultaneous 
regional and local elections decrease alternation (‒6% for seat share and ‒10% 
for the major party).
In contrast to our expectations, alternation does not increase when regional 
elections are held mid-way through the national electoral cycle. We have calcu-
lated predicted probabilities for when a regional election is held one, two, three, 
or four years after a national election (while keeping dummy variables at their 
mode and non-dummy variables at their mean) and alternation in proportion of 
seats decreases respectively by 8%, 14%, 16%, and 15% whereas the probability 
that the major party will alternate decreases from 65% to respectively 52%, 44%, 
40%, and 42%. A closer look at the electoral timing of regional elections within 
countries reveals that countries where we may find the largest second-order 
election effects also tend to be the countries which hold their regional elections 
at the same time and almost exactly (e.g. Norway) or often close to (e.g. the 
Netherlands) mid-term in the national electoral cycle (Dandoy and Schakel 
2013). These are also the countries which apply a practice of consensus coalition 
government at the regional level (Table 2). Overall, the results strongly indicate 
that scholars studying regional government composition are well advised to 
take account of the multi-level electoral setting.
Finally, political regionalism matters too for regional executive government.18 
The extent of cross-cutting increases when regional parties increase their seat 
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16   A. H. SCHAKEL AND E. MASSETTI
share and especially when regional parties are in government. Although this 
result is not surprising, we do find the impact quite considerable. The extent 
of cross-cutting increases from 0.56 to 0.67 and to 0.77 when the seat share of 
regional parties that are in regional executive government increases respectively 
from 5% to 20% and to 35% (roughly the average and plus one and two standard 
deviations, see Table A1). The probability to find oversized government sharply 
declines with increasing seat share for regional parties (from 62% to 45% to 
30%), but when a regional party is included in the executive the probability 
for oversized government does not change. This result may be due to the fact 
that regional parties which become electorally stronger can reduce the political 
space for competing state-wide parties (or coalitions), which may find it harder 
to form governments with oversized majorities.
Alternation increases when regional parties increase their seat share, unless 
regional parties are in office because then their increasing seat share decreases 
alternation. Regional parties may act as brokers between centre-left and cen-
tre-right state-wide parties which alternate in executive government but which 
still rely on regional party support to find a majority basis in the regional 
assembly. Alternation increases when regional parties become electorally strong 
and compete for office with one (or two) main state-wide parties. When elec-
torally strong regional parties enter into regional executive government they 
tend to decrease alternation because they might turn into hegemonic parties, 
as can be observed in Bayern (CSU Bayerns), South Tyrol (SVP), and in some 
Spanish regions. That might be due to the fact that they are primarily perceived 
as actors representing an identity, rather than running an administration with 
functional aims, and are therefore less subject to be punished by voters for 
their incumbency position (Alonso 2008). However, the number of ‘hegemonic’ 
regional parties is limited and they constitute between 94 (sum of seat share 
above 35%) and 158 (sum of seat share above 20%) observations out of a total 
of 1746, which respectively constitutes 5.4% and 9.0%.19
More research is required to further investigate these two ‘mechanisms’.20 
First, regional parties may, apart from being regionalist (i.e. having a self-
rule demand), take up centrist or median positions in the party system. 
Unfortunately, we cannot control for the left‒right position of regional parties 
because this data is missing. Second, a conditional logit model is to be pre-
ferred as a modelling strategy because it would allow for an analysis on the 
probability of government participation of regional parties while comparing the 
actual outcome to all possible alternative governments after a regional election 
has been held. Building this dataset requires a significant effort, as it not only 
entails including all potential governments but it also entails identifying all the 
potential coalitions for 2055 regional elections with up to 18 parties that win 
seats (e.g. in the elections in Sardinia in 2014 and Sicily in 2001).
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Discussion
The first objective of this article was to present an overview of the institu-
tional variance that we find at regional level, even in a relatively homogeneous 
area such as Western Europe. This overview (with full details presented in 
the country profiles in the online appendix) and the dataset will be of use for 
future studies wanting to compare many countries. The comparative data on 
regional institutions show interesting variance across countries and regions, 
sometimes created by recent reforms. This variance can also allow compara-
tive studies to engage more explicitly with normative debates. Indeed, many 
decentralisation reforms are implemented with the argument that they will 
enhance democracy by bringing government ‘closer to the people’ (Däubler et 
al. 2017; Sharpe 1993). However, the appointment from above of non-elected 
officials as heads (or co-heads) of regional office, as well as the creation of 
monocratic or hyper-presidential institutions, might call into question the way 
in which regional democracy is pursued. In addition, the lack of alternation 
in regional office for extremely long periods of time, due to state-wide parties’ 
regional electoral strongholds or the presence of hegemonic regional parties, 
raises questions about the types of democracy we often find at regional level, 
even when all criteria of ‘free and fair elections’ are guaranteed.
Our second objective was to explain not only multi-level government con-
gruence but also other key features of regional government, namely government 
alternation and the presence of oversized majority coalitions. We found that 
most institutional variables have an impact on government constellation or 
alternation, or both. In most cases, their effects are in line with our expectations. 
In particular, we find confirmation of previous studies on the effect of self-rule 
on government cross-cutting, while shared rule does not seem to have an effect. 
Of particular interest is the effect of presidential systems, which appear to push 
regional political dynamics in a majoritarian direction. Indeed, their impact is 
exactly the opposite of that of consensual practices: the former has a reinforcing 
effect on cross-cutting and alternation, while the latter has a weakening effect 
on both. Like presidential systems, majoritarian voting systems tend to increase 
government alternation. Government cross-cutting appears to be influenced 
also by the horizontal simultaneity of regional elections. Clearly, holding many 
regional elections at the same time increases the possibility of second-order 
election effects, by which parties that are in national office tend to be punished 
and might lose office at the regional level. These are important findings because 
the composition of regional government may have a large impact on public 
policy – see e.g. Kleider et al. (2017) on subnational expenditures on education, 
Huwyler et al. (2017) and Tosun and Ulrich-Hartung (2017) on European 
policy-making ‒ and the extent to which voters will hold regional government 
accountable – see e.g. León et al. (2017).
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18   A. H. SCHAKEL AND E. MASSETTI
Regarding regional parties, we found that they may increase the dynamism 
of regional democracy by increasing alternation in office but they may also 
turn regions into one-party hegemonies. Regional parties win seats in 35% of 
the regional elections in our sample and they have been part of the regional 
executive in just under 10% of the total 1746 observations in our dataset. Hence, 
regional parties are quite common and they therefore may have an important 
impact on the constellation and alternation of regional executive authority. 
Regional party hegemonies – loosely defined as receiving more than 35% of 
the votes and in regional office – are relatively rare but still constitute 4.1% of 
our observations (78 out of a total 1746 of regional governments). Nevertheless, 
further empirical analysis is necessary to observe how far our results are valid. 
In particular, an important next step would be to analyse how far the results 
still hold when the left‒right position of regional parties is taken into account.
The data and analysis presented in this article represent a step forward in 
the comparative literature on regional government. In the light of growing 
policy-making, taxing, and budgeting powers of regions (Hooghe et al. 2016a), 
further research on regional democracy and regional government is needed 
(see also Däubler et al. 2017). In particular, our data and findings call for fur-
ther studies of both an empirical and a normative nature. On the one hand, we 
need more in-depth studies on how citizens make sense of regional democracy 
in general, and of regional democracy without (or with rare) alternation in 
office in particular. On the other hand, we need more studies which reflect, 
from a normative perspective, on the different purpose of regional democracy, 
depending on the presence/absence of important ethno-territorial cleavages, 
and on the match (or mismatch) between the powers attributed to regional 
institutions and democratic standards (e.g. central government appointment 
of the head executives, monocratic or hyper-presidential executives, etc.) of 
regional institutional systems. Both types of studies would provide interesting 
material for the development of a ‘regional political science’.
Notes
1.  For example, our Regional Executive Government Dataset complements the 
Regional Election Dataset developed by Arjan H. Schakel (available at http://
www.arjanschakel.nl), the Regional Authority Index dataset (available at http://
www.unc.edu/~gwmarks/data_ra.php), and the Varieties of Democracy dataset 
(available at https://www.v-dem.net/en/).
2.  Our data includes all but two of the 15 West European countries which hold 
regional elections and where the regional executive is (partly) appointed by 
regional councillors and/or directly elected by citizens (Dandoy and Schakel 
2013). We do not include Finland (Aland islands) and Portugal (Azores and 
Madeira). Regional government data for Sweden before 1994 and Switzerland 
before 1980 are not available.
3.  More detailed information is provided in the online appendix.
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4.  Cross-cutting is operationalised by computing the share of parliamentarians that 
need to switch their party affiliation to make full congruence between regional 
and national government (Bäck et al. 2013).
5.  A government is oversized when the its seat share is higher than 50% when 
the seat share for the smallest party is subtracted from the total seat share of 
the government.
6.  This variable is operationalised by taking the absolute difference between the 
seat shares for parties forming a government and for the preceding government 
(when a party is not in (preceding) government its vote share is zero), summing 
these differences across parties and dividing by sum of total seats share for the 
government and preceding government.
7.  The major party is identified as the party with the largest seat share. When 
seat shares are equal we look at the vote shares to identify the major party. 
We did not opt to code the party of the head of the executive because, due 
to institutional variance, the nature and the logic of appointment of the post 
changes considerably from country to country: the prime minister might change 
according to strict rules (Switzerland); the head of the executive might not be 
elected but appointed by central government (the Netherlands); the executive 
might be, strictly speaking, collegial (Sweden); or there might be two heads 
of executive power (France and Norway), which puts into doubt which party 
affiliation should be coded.
8.  An important benefit of this operationalisation is that the regional executive 
is compared for each election and we specifically analyse changes in regional 
government after a subsequent regional election has been held. If we were to 
include governments which have changed without calling for early elections 
it would require us to define what constitutes a new government. In addition, 
apart from regions in Germany and Spain, we lack data on changes in regional 
executive government in between elections. Furthermore, regions in Denmark, 
France, Italy (ordinary statute regions until the 2000s), the Netherlands, Norway, 
and Sweden hold horizontal simultaneous regional elections with fixed electoral 
cycles without the possibility of holding early elections. This significantly reduces 
the incentives for parties to enter or leave government in between elections.
9.  France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Northern Ireland and Wales in the 
United Kingdom.
10.  Denmark, France, Greece, and London in the United Kingdom.
11.  Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, South Tyrol 
in Italy, and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. The coding is based on 
the literature (Dandoy and Schakel 2013; Deschouwer 2006; Klingelhofer and 
Müller 2015; Lehmbruch 1993, 2003; Lijphart 1969; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991; 
van Haute and Deschouwer 2017). It is important to note that one of the criteria 
used by scholars to identify consensus democracy often includes the presence 
of broad coalition governments.
12.  France since 2004, Greece, and some Swiss cantons.
13.  Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy (ordinary statute regions until the 
2000s), the Netherlands, Norway, Spain (non-historic regions), and Sweden.
14.  Austria (Vienna), Denmark, Germany (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg), Greece, 
Italy (ordinary statute regions until the 2000s), Norway, Spain (non-historic 
regions), and Sweden.
15.  We also ran models which include the vote shares for regional parties and 
the main findings remain robust, which is not surprising considering that the 
Pearson correlation between vote and seat shares for regional parties is 0.97 
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(p < 0.001). Table A2 provides more detail on the number of regional parties 
and their average seat and vote shares.
16.  The models have been run in Stata with the mixed and xtlogit commands.
17.  These estimates have been produced through the margins Stata-command.
18.  The reported results appear to be robust in a fixed (country) effects model 
specification.
19.  Obviously, the probability that a regional party will be included in government 
increases with the seat share won by regional parties. Out of a total of 94 
observations whereby the sum of regional party seat share is above 35%, 81 
observations (i.e. 86%) concern instances where a regional party was included 
in the regional government.
20.  We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising the subsequent 
two issues.
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics.
  Mean St.dev. Min Max
alternation seats (%) 0.26 0.34 0.00 1.00
cross-cutting 0.53 0.35 0.01 1.00
oversized 0.52 0.50 0 1
alternation major party 0.25 0.43 0 1
rokkan region 0.34 0.47 0 1
regional party seat share 5.77 14.30 0 100
regional party in government 0.10 0.30 0 1
self-rule 12.64 2.95 1 18
shared rule 4.38 4.10 0 12
central government appointee 0.34 0.47 0 1
president 0.21 0.40 0 1
consensual democracy 0.40 0.49 0 1
Majoritarian 0.12 0.32 0 1
simultaneity regional 0.64 0.48 0 1
simultaneity local 0.48 0.50 0 1
Year 1.87 1.10 0 4.9
Year2 4.71 4.34 0 24.2
notes: the number of observations is 1746 for 250 regions nested in 13 countries.
Table A2. average sum of vote and seat shares for regional parties.
Country
All Seats Votes
parties N N (%) share N N (%) share
austria 107 8 7.5 1.0 77 72.0 1.5
Belgium 166 9 5.4 16.3 122 73.5 17.3
Denmark 124 11 8.9 0.9 80 64.5 1.5
France 84 26 31.0 1.8 32 38.1 1.6
Germany 333 23 6.9 8.3 221 66.4 8.2
Greece 15 1 6.7 4.9 1 6.7 6.4
italy 490 143 29.2 11.6 355 72.4 12.7
netherlands 184 28 15.2 1.2 124 67.4 1.6
norway 58 14 24.1 0.9 25 43.1 0.9
spain 671 92 13.7 20.4 580 86.4 22.2
sweden 45 10 22.2 2.7 27 60.0 3.2
switzerland 415 81 19.5 2.4 376 90.6 2.7
united Kingdom 148 34 23.0 57.4 127 85.8 55.5
total 2840 480 16.9 6.3 2147 75.6 6.9
notes: see table 1 for the number of included regions and elections per country.
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Table A3. Multivariate analysis on characteristics of regional government.
Cross-cutting Alternation seats (%)
beta s.e. p beta s.e. p
self-rule 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.08
shared rule 0.02 0.03 0.37 −0.04 0.01 0.00
central government appointee 0.18 0.06 0.01 −0.08 0.03 0.02
president 0.13 0.07 0.06 −0.16 0.04 0.00
consensus −0.15 0.06 0.01 −0.21 0.03 0.00
Majoritarian 0.01 0.05 0.89 0.19 0.03 0.00
simultaneity regional 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.00
simultaneity local −0.01 0.03 0.76 −0.06 0.02 0.01
Year 0.04 0.03 0.15 −0.11 0.03 0.00
Year2 −0.01 0.03 0.84 0.07 0.03 0.01
rokkan region 0.01 0.02 0.56 −0.04 0.02 0.14
regional party seats (%) 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.00
regional party in government 0.01 0.04 0.89 0.16 0.04 0.00
 interaction 0.06 0.02 0.00 −0.13 0.03 0.00
constant 0.43 0.05 0.00 0.36 0.03 0.00
rho 0.170 0.141
log likelihood −503 −395
Variance governments 0.098 0.092
Variance regions 0.000 0.002
Variance countries 0.005 0.000
N governments 1981 1746
N regions 257 250
N countries 13     13    
notes: shown are the results of a multi-level linear regression model whereby governments are clustered 
in regions which are subsequently nested in countries. the models include a rho coefficient to control for 
autocorrelation and non-dummy variables are standardised (see table a1).
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Table A4. Multivariate analysis on characteristics of regional government.
Oversized Alternation major party
beta s.e. p beta s.e. p
self-rule −0.26 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.45
shared rule −0.54 0.17 0.00 −0.19 0.13 0.16
central government appointee −1.84 0.53 0.00 −0.48 0.30 0.12
president (omitted) −0.99 0.35 0.01
consensus 2.30 0.40 0.00 −0.86 0.27 0.00
Majoritarian 0.39 1.02 0.71 1.36 0.30 0.00
simultaneity regional 0.05 0.35 0.89 1.31 0.31 0.00
simultaneity local −0.50 0.27 0.07 −0.44 0.22 0.05
Year 0.99 0.27 0.00 −0.73 0.26 0.00
Year2 −0.87 0.27 0.00 0.46 0.26 0.07
rokkan region 0.36 0.34 0.29 −0.15 0.24 0.54
regional party seats (%) −0.77 0.22 0.00 0.58 0.16 0.00
regional party in government −0.92 0.37 0.01 1.47 0.34 0.00
 interaction 0.79 0.27 0.00 −0.82 0.22 0.00
constant 0.39 0.40 0.34 −1.34 0.32 0.00
rho 0.327 0.178
log likelihood −775 −860
N governments 1518 1742
N regions 148 250
N countries 10 13
notes: shown are the results of a logit model (1 = oversized; 1 = major party alters) whereby governments 
are clustered in regions and which includes a rho coefficient to control for autocorrelation over time. 
non-dummy variables are standardised (see table a1). president is omitted because this variable explains 
oversized perfectly and 464 observations (Denmark, France, and Greece) are dropped from the analysis.
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